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Chinese households save a lot, and their savings rates have increased in recent years. After remaining relatively flat during the early 1990s, the average sav-
ings rate of urban households, relative to their disposable income, rose from 17 per-
cent in 1995 to 24 percent in 2005. This increase took place against a background 
of rapid income growth and a real interest rate on bank deposits that has been low 
over this period (and even negative in some years, as nominal deposit rates are 
capped by the government). In this paper, we attempt to understand the reasons 
behind this phenomenon of a rising household savings rate. To this end, we use data 
from the annual Urban Household Surveys conducted by China’s National Bureau of 
Statistics to analyze the evolution of the urban household savings rate over the period 
1990–2005. We believe this is the first detailed examination of Chinese household 
savings behavior using micro data over a long span.1
1 Most previous studies have relied on aggregate data (e.g., Franco Modigliani and Shi Larry Cao 2004; Louis 
Kuijs 2006) or provincial-level data (e.g., Yingyi Qian 1988; Aart Kraay 2000; Charles Yuji Horioka and Junmin 
Wan 2007).
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From 1995 to 2005, the average urban household savings rate in 
China rose by 7 percentage points, to about one-quarter of dispos-
able income. Savings rates increased across all demographic groups, 
and the age profile of savings has an unusual pattern in recent years, 
with younger and older households having relatively high savings 
rates. We argue that these patterns are best explained by the rising 
private burden of expenditures on housing, education, and health 
care. These effects and precautionary motives may have been ampli-
fied by financial underdevelopment, including constraints on bor-
rowing against future income and low returns on financial assets. 
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It is worth noting that the increase in household savings is not simply compen-
sating for reduced savings by other sectors of the economy. Figure 1 shows that 
gross domestic savings in China has surged since 2000, climbing to over 50 percent 
of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2005. In particular, enterprise saving—includ-
ing that of state-owned enterprises—has risen sharply in recent years. Government 
savings (which is subsequently used for public investment) has also increased. 
Household savings has declined as a percentage of national income even as it has 
increased as a share of household disposable income, but this is mainly because of 
a fall in the share of household income in national income.2 The aggregate (urban 
and rural) household savings rate has, in fact, risen by 6 percentage points over the 
last decade.
It is difficult to reconcile the phenomenon of a rising household savings rate with 
conventional intertemporal models of consumption. When trend income growth is 
high, households seeking to smooth their consumption should borrow against future 
income, especially if real interest rates are low. If that is not possible, households 
(particularly younger ones) should at least postpone their savings. But, as we show 
2 In China, state-owned enterprises did not distribute profits to households or the government in the form of 
























Figure 1. Contributions to Gross Domestic Savings as a Percentage of GDP
Note: Household savings, shown here, are based on national accounts data, which imply higher savings rates than 
those based on household survey data (see Table A1).
Source: CEIC, National Bureau of Statistics (China), and International Monetary Fund (IMF).
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in this paper, savings rates have increased across all demographic groups, including 
those that can expect rapid income growth in the future.
We estimate how savings rates vary with time, age, and cohort (year of birth) of 
the household head, using a variant of the decomposition in Angus S. Deaton and 
Christina H. Paxson (1994). The most interesting result is that we find a U-shaped 
pattern of savings over the life cycle, wherein the younger and older households 
have the highest savings rates. This is the opposite of the traditional “hump-shaped” 
profile of savings over the life cycle in which young workers save very little (in 
anticipation of rising income), savings rates tend to peak when earnings potential 
is the highest (middle age), and then fall off as workers approach retirement. This 
relationship between age and savings rate differs considerably from the norm for 
other countries.
Demographic shifts do not go very far in explaining saving behavior. For instance, 
the cohorts most affected by the one-child policy are not among the highest savers. 
Even after we control for broader demographic shifts, there remains a substantial 
time trend in household savings rates, implying that the rising savings rates must 
be the result of economy-wide changes affecting all households. As with most other 
studies using household data, we also find very limited consumption smoothing over 
the life cycle.3
What can account for these patterns? Habit formation could drive up savings 
rates by restraining consumption growth despite high income growth (Christopher 
D. Carroll and David N. Weil 1994). However, we find little empirical support for 
that channel as consumption growth does not seem to have much persistence once 
we control for other factors. Instead, the declining public provision of education, 
health, and housing services (the breaking of the “iron rice bowl”) appears to have 
created new motives for saving. While health and education expenditures accounted 
for 2 percent of consumption expenditures among the households in our sample in 
1995, this share rose to 14 percent by 2005.4 This can contribute to rising savings, as 
younger households accumulate assets to prepare for future education expenditures, 
and older households prepare for uncertain (and lumpy) health expenditures.
Moreover, there has been an extensive privatization of the housing stock. Only 
17 percent of households in our sample owned their homes in 1990. By 2005, that 
figure had risen to 86 percent. Most house purchases were financed by the with-
drawal of past savings, suggesting that this has been an important motive for house-
hold savings over the past decade. Simple back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest 
that housing related motives could account for nearly a 3 percentage point increase 
in savings rates since the early 1990s. Many houses purchased under the housing 
reform process are of low quality, however, suggesting that as income levels rise and 
the capacity to buy better houses increases, savings rates could stay high on account 
3 See, for example, Paxson (1996). Horioka and Wan (2007) use provincial-level data and also find a limited 
role for variables related to the age structure in explaining saving behavior. Modigliani and Shi Larry Cao (2004) 
find evidence in favor of the life-cycle hypothesis using aggregate (national level) data.
4 These expenditures are superior goods, with an income elasticity greater than one. Rapid income growth 
and the aging of the population have amplified the trend toward direct private expenditures on those services. 
The share of government (central and local) expenditures accounted for by expenditures on culture, education, 
science, and health care has fallen from 22 percent in 1995 to 18 percent in 2005. 
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of this motive, as the mortgage market is still underdeveloped. Indeed, given the 
durable nature of houses, households with good income growth prospects may con-
tinue to have high savings in order to make down payments on higher quality houses 
commensurate with their future income.
The overall macroeconomic uncertainty associated with the transition to a market 
economy has contributed to precautionary savings motives, although we do not find 
strong evidence that the effect of macro uncertainty has been quantitatively impor-
tant. One interesting result is that the cohorts that were in their 40s and 50s in 1990 
tended to save more, perhaps because they are the ones most exposed to the uncer-
tainties generated by the market-oriented reforms and do not have many working 
years ahead to benefit from those reforms.
We also investigate the target savings hypothesis, according to which households 
have a target level of savings. Since bank deposits are the primary financial assets for 
Chinese households, their savings rates are negatively correlated with real returns 
on bank deposits. We find some weak suggestive evidence that, even if taken at face 
value, points to a small effect. While cultural factors are often considered a promis-
ing explanation for the high savings rates observed in East Asian economies, they 
cannot account for the trend in savings rates that is our primary focus in this paper.5
After examining the empirical relevance of various hypotheses individually, 
we estimate a composite regression to evaluate the relative importance of the most 
promising ones. We find that the risk of large health expenditures can explain high 
savings for households headed by older persons, and that savings are also higher for 
households whose composition portends large education expenditures in the future. 
These and other strands of evidence suggest that precautionary motives and the rising 
private burden of social expenditures has driven the increase in household savings 
rates. In the composite regression, the effects of home ownership status on savings 
are somewhat muted, on average, although we do find that owners of poor-quality 
homes (homes with values below the respective provincial median) have higher sav-
ings rates than those with better homes. More interestingly, we find that owning a 
home is associated with sharply lower savings rates (4–7 percentage points) among 
young households, but not among older ones. The relatively high income levels of 
younger households also help explain their high savings rates. All of these effects are 
amplified in an environment of financial repression, which has resulted in the lack of 
instruments for borrowing against future income, limited opportunities for portfolio 
diversification, and low real returns on bank deposits.6 Of course, these channels can 
only account for an increase in the savings rate during an adjustment period. They 
cannot, by themselves, sustain high savings rates in the long run.
In the final section of this paper, we combine the empirical results with some 
macroeconomic data to discuss possible implications for the evolution of household 
savings in China. Our estimates suggest a modest role for projected demographic 
changes on household savings. Since our preferred explanations for the high and 
5 Carroll, Byung-Kun Rhee, and Changyong Rhee (1994) compare the savings behavior of different immi-
grant groups in Canada and find no evidence of cultural effects on savings.
6 A previous version of this paper has a simple model that highlights these points. The model builds on the 
work of Tullio Jappelli and Marco Pagano (1994), who illustrate how the interaction of rapid income growth and 
borrowing constraints due to financial underdevelopment can drive up savings rates. 
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rising savings rates are related to China’s transition to a market economy and the 
underdeveloped financial system, it is possible that savings rates will decline as new 
financial instruments (for borrowing and for portfolio diversification) become preva-
lent, and once households have accumulated a sufficiently large stock of assets to 
cope with the new economic environment. The shift from public to private provision 
of education, health, and housing can help explain rising savings rates during an 
adjustment period. Government policy toward social expenditures will be relevant 
for determining the longer term trajectory of savings based on this motive (Olivier 
J. Blanchard and Francesco Giavazzi 2006, emphasize this point). Thus, the insights 
obtained by moving from aggregate- to household-level data, and the analysis in 
this paper, can inform the debate on how to “rebalance” growth in China by stoking 
private consumption growth.
I. Dataset
We begin by discussing our dataset. The availability of household-level data from 
China is limited. A subset of the annual Urban Household Survey (UHS) conducted 
by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) is available through the Databank for 
China Studies at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. The data cover the entire 
UHS for the period 1986–1992, and a subset of 10 provinces/municipalities for the 
period 1993–1997.7 We have extended the coverage of that subset until 2005 through 
a collaboration agreement with the NBS. Unfortunately, no similar arrangement is 
available for the NBS Rural Household Survey. Table A1 in the Appendix provides 
a comparison of income levels and savings rates in the Urban and Rural Household 
Surveys as well as in the Flow of Funds Accounts of the National Accounts.
The UHS is based on a probabilistic sample and stratified design. It provides 
household-level information for a number of variables, including detailed informa-
tion on income and consumption expenditures. It also provides demographic and 
employment information about household members, living conditions, and a num-
ber of other household characteristics. The data are collected over the course of 
the year. Households are asked to keep a record of their income and expenditures, 
which is collected every month by a surveyor. Table 1 reports summary statistics for 
household income, consumption, and the resulting savings rates. The sample size 
goes up in 2002. In that year, the survey instrument was also refined to obtain more 
detailed responses to some questions. Households should (in principle) remain in the 
sampling frame for three years. This provides a limited panel component, although 
consistent coding of repeat households is available beginning in 2002.
The measure of disposable income that we focus on includes labor income, prop-
erty income, transfers (both social and private, including gifts), and income from 
household sideline production. The consumption expenditure variable covers a 
broad range of categories.8 Table A2 in the Appendix describes the changes in the 
distribution of consumption across different groups of goods. Neither income nor 
7 Anhui, Beijing, Chongqin, Ganshu, Guangdong, Hubei, Jiangsu, Liaoning, Shanxi, and Sichuan. 
8 Food; clothing and footwear; household appliances, goods and services; medical care and health; transport 
and communications; recreational, educational, and cultural services; housing; and sundries.
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consumption measures capture the consumption value of owner-occupied housing.9 
All flow variables are expressed on an annual basis and, where relevant, nominal vari-
ables are deflated using the provincial consumer price index (CPI). We measure sav-
ings as the difference between disposable income and consumption expenditures.10
A potential concern at this juncture is that the micro data indicate household 
savings rates lower than those suggested by the aggregate data taken from the Flow 
of Funds Accounts. The Flow of Funds data indicate a household savings rate of 
32 percent in 2004, the last year for which those data are available. This is about 7 
percentage points higher than the household survey-based estimate of the savings 
rate. The discrepancies between micro and macro data on savings ratios are an issue 
in virtually every country in which both types of data are available. Deaton (2005) 
documents systematic discrepancies whereby survey-based measures of income and 
consumption are different than those from the national accounts in most countries. 
Some of these differences can be traced to definitional issues.
Perhaps, more importantly, it is usually difficult to get adequate survey response 
rates from high-income households. These households tend to have high savings 
propensities. Figure 2 (left panel) shows that savings rates are higher for the top 
deciles of the household income distribution covered in our sample. The shares of 
9 Households report their estimate for the rental value of owner-occupied housing from 2002 onward. Later 
in the paper, we discuss how we separately estimate the rental value of owner-occupied houses for all years and 
incorporate it in the savings rate and income measures. These estimates are noisy, however, since it is rare for 
households to live in a rented private house. Hence, we use those estimates only in a few specifications to test the 
sensitivity of our main results.
10 This residual measure of savings includes transfer expenditures. This is appropriate to the extent that these 
expenditures reflect implicit risk sharing contracts among households. These transfer expenditures are fairly well 
spread across household demographic groups and different income levels. Our results are robust to their exclusion 















1990 4,846 12,795 10,897 915 3.4 14.8
1991 4,913 13,221 11,332 995 3.3 14.3
1992 6,273 14,890 12,556 1,070 3.3 15.7
1993 6,109 15,879 13,412 1,119 3.2 15.5
1994 6,290 17,306 14,517 1,188 3.2 16.1
1995 6,297 17,677 14,964 1,256 3.2 15.4
1996 6,288 18,232 15,193 1,362 3.2 16.7
1997 6,242 19,065 15,806 1,525 3.2 17.1
1998 6,255 20,250 16,721 1,696 3.1 17.4
1999 6,294 21,237 17,485 1,815 3.1 17.7
2000 6,261 23,179 19,031 1,993 3.1 17.9
2001 6,300 24,344 19,354 2,093 3.1 20.5
2002 16,607 25,324 20,378 2,708 3.0 19.5
2003 19,351 26,824 21,257 2,805 3.1 20.8
2004 20,680 29,068 22,755 3,037 3.0 21.7
2005 21,849 31,450 24,412 3,084 3.0 22.4
Notes: Data for 1990–1997 are from the subset of the UHS available through the Databank for China Studies of 
the Chinese University of Hong Kong. Data for 1998 onward are from the NBS. Income and consumption are con-
verted to constant 2005 prices based on the Urban CPI. Savings rates are defined as 1 − consumption/income. 
Definition of consumption expenditures does not include transfer expenditures.
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total  savings accounted for by each income decile (Figure 2, right panel) show that 
the top two deciles alone account for over half of total savings.11 The increase in sav-
ings rates was also more pronounced among the richer households. Thus, an under-
sampling of rich households could understate average savings.12
One other issue is whether our 10-province sample is a representative subset of 
the full UHS sample. Table 2 compares the savings rates in our sample with those 
from available tabulations of the entire UHS sample. The figures are quite compa-
rable. By arrangement with the NBS, we also checked many of our results reported 
in subsequent sections with data for the full sample for selected years. There were 
no major discrepancies in the results.13
II. Stylized Facts
We now provide a basic empirical characterization of savings patterns based on 
the micro data. Figure 3 shows, for selected years from 1990 to 2005, cross-sectional 
averages of disposable income and consumption (all in 2005 constant prices) as a 
function of the age of the household head. There has been an enormous increase in
11 The results were similar when we sorted households by a crude measure of permanent income, which we 
estimated by regressing household income on dummies for education, occupation, and type of employment of the 
household head, as well as the household head’s age and square.
12 In the UHS, the ratio of income at the ninety-ninth percentile to median income is about 4.6 in 2005. Annual 
income at the ninety-ninth percentile is about 120,000 yuan (about $14,560). It is possible that the coverage of 
very high-income households is limited. This could be important for reconciling micro and macro data. 
13 Our analysis sample covers about 45 percent of the total number of observations (using sampling weights) in 
the full UHS sample. As a further check on the reliability of our data, we obtained data from the China Household 
Income Project. Unfortunately, that survey was conducted only once every few years, and the last publicly avail-
able data from that survey are for 1995. For that year, the average urban household savings rate, and other patterns 
in that survey, were very similar to those in our sample. 
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Figure 2. Savings Rate and Share of Total Savings by Income Quintile
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average income over this period, with consumption closely following both measures 
of income. These figures suggest that Chinese households did not borrow against 
expected future income growth in order to smooth their lifetime consumption. These 
plots do not seem consistent with the life cycle/permanent income hypothesis, which 
predicts that consumption should be smoothed over the life cycle.
The age profiles of income (Figure 3) exhibit a familiar hump-shaped pattern in 
1990 and 1995. That is, income initially increases with age, but, after peaking in the 
mid- to late-50s, begins to decline. Interestingly, that pattern changes over time, and 
by 2005, the profile has two peaks, with younger households enjoying a relatively 
high level of income. Based on related work using the same dataset in which we 
analyze the evolution of labor earnings inequality, we conjecture that improvements 
in educational attainment can explain much of the increase in income for younger 
households.14 This phenomenon of rising returns to human capital is quite typical 
for transition economies (see, e.g., Michael P. Keane and Eswar S. Prasad 2006, 
for the case of Poland). But what is truly striking about the last panel of this figure 
is that, rather than the traditional hump-shaped age-savings profile, we find that 
 savings rates have become highest in the early stages of the life cycle, and a second 
local peak occurs near the age of retirement.
It is possible that Figure 3 may be picking up differences across cohorts in saving 
propensities. Since our dataset consists of repeated cross-sections rather than panel 
data, we can investigate this issue only by constructing “synthetic” cohorts. That is, 
we treat household heads in different survey years who share the same birth year as 
14 In our sample, as of 1995, 24 percent of the household heads in their 30s had attended college or junior 
college, while 20 percent of those in their 40s, 50s, and 60s had attended college or junior college. By 2005, 
those figures had risen to 45.6 percent and 25.3 percent, respectively. The Cultural Revolution, which disrupted 
schools and universities in the 1960s and 1970s, may have affected the educational attainment of older cohorts. 
The subsequent increase in education levels may reflect rising skills premia, and also the rise in income levels. 
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1992 15.7 17.5 1.15
1993 15.5 18.1 1.15
1994 16.0 18.4 1.16
1995 15.2 17.4 1.13
1996 16.7 19.0 1.13
1997 16.8 18.9 1.13
1998 17.3 20.2 1.15
1999 17.6 21.1 1.12
2000 17.9 20.4 1.16
2001 20.7 22.6 1.14
2002 20.0 21.7 1.06
2003 21.4 23.1 1.02
2004 22.3 23.8 1.04
2005 22.8 24.3 1.04
Notes: Savings rates based on 1 − average per capita consumption/average per capita disposable income. Taking 
per capita averages (as opposed to household averages) yields results slightly different from those in Table 1, but 
this is necessary for purposes of comparison with the published tabulations of the entire survey.
VOL. 2 NO. 1 101CHAMON AND PRASAD: WHY ARE SAVING RATES IN CHINA RISING?
being part of the same cohort, even though we are not tracking the same households 
over time.
Figure 4A plots income and consumption against the age of the household head, 
with each line corresponding to a different cohort. (For example, the first line traces 
the income and consumption paths over time for those households whose heads were 
25 years old in 1990.) This figure shows that consumption tracks income over the 
life cycle across cohorts, confirming the lack of consumption smoothing over the life 
cycle. Controlling for the demographic characteristics of households does not alter 
the consumption profiles, which still increase substantially over time (Figure 4B).15
15 This exercise follows Orazio P. Attanasio and Martin Browning (1995), who show that demographic con-





























































Figure 3. Average Disposable Income and Consumption by Age of Head of Household
Notes: In all plots, disposable income corresponds to the top line and consumption to the bottom line. Income and 
consumption profiles were smoothed by a three-year moving average (the averages for each age were combined 
with those for the ages immediately above and below).
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Figure 5 plots the savings rate as a function of the age of the head of household 
in the cross-section of households for 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2005. In 1990, the age-
savings profile exhibits a hump-shaped pattern, with the savings rate increasing with 
age, peaking at around age 50, and then declining with age. Such behavior is close to 
what life-cycle theory would predict, given borrowing constraints that limit borrow-
ing against future income and rising labor earnings over some range of the working 
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Figure 4. Income and Consumption for Different Cohorts Over Time
Notes: Consumption adjusted for changes in demographics obtained by regressing, at the synthetic cohort level, 
log(consumption) on: log(household size), number of children, number of adults, and a dummy for whether the house-
hold has children. Results for adjusted consumption reported correspond to a household consisting of two adults.
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life. However, the age-savings profile starts to shift to a U-shaped pattern in the 
mid-1990s, and this pattern becomes more pronounced in the 2000s. That is, young 
households save a lot more of their income than was the case a decade ago. Savings 
rates decline with age with a trough around the time the head of household is in his/
her 40s, before rising as the household head approaches retirement age. This type 
of savings behavior—the relatively high savings rates at the early and late stages of 
the life cycle—is puzzling as it does not conform to the standard life-cycle model, 
especially in the context of a fast-growing economy.
We have, so far, discussed cohort, age, and time effects, and their roles in driving 
savings behavior separately. Of course, these are all operating simultaneously in the 
data, and jointly determine aggregate household savings. In the next section, we use 
a simple econometric approach to disentangle these effects.
III. Demographic Effects on Household Savings Rates: A Decomposition Analysis
Like many other countries, China is undergoing a major demographic transition. 
The one-child policy and the aging of the population have increased the old-age depen-
dency ratio and are projected to increase it further in coming years. Hence, a more 
careful analysis of demographic factors seems warranted in accounting for the rise in 
savings. Indeed, it seems plausible that these factors could be of first-order importance.
The cross-sectional age and cohort profiles of household savings in Section III 
represent a composite of age, cohort, and time effects. Different age and cohort 
groups are likely to have very different savings behavior, and these behaviors are 
likely to change over time. It is necessary to separate out age, cohort, and time 
effects in order to characterize more clearly the effects of demographic variation on 
changes in savings patterns. We decompose the contribution of these effects to sav-
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Figure 5. Average Savings Rates by Age of Head of Household 
(Saving Rate = 1 – Consumption/Disposable Income)
Note: Income and consumption profiles were smoothed by a three-year moving average (the averages for each age 
were combined with those for the ages immediately above and below).
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A. Estimation Strategy
If there are no shocks to income, and the real interest rate is constant, then the 
life-cycle hypothesis predicts that consumption at any given age should be propor-
tional to lifetime resources, with the constant of proportionality depending on the 
age of the household head and the real interest rate. That is,
 cha = fh(a)Wh,
where cha denotes the consumption of household h headed by an individual of age a 
and with lifetime resources Wh . Taking logs of the expression above and averaging 
it based on age and year of birth b yields
  
____
 ln cab =  
_____
 ln f (a)  +  
____
 ln Wb  .
In our estimation, the age effects  
_____
 ln f (a)  are captured by a vector of age dummies, 
and the lifetime resources  
____
 ln Wb are characterized by a vector of cohort (year of 
birth) and time dummies. The estimated consumption equation is
(1)   
____
 ln cab = D aαc + D bγc + D tθc + εc,
where Da, Db, and Dt are matrices of age, year of birth, and year dummies; αc, γc, 
and θc are the corresponding age, cohort, and year effects on consumption; and εc 
is the error term. The year fixed effects should capture differences in consump-
tion resulting from aggregate shocks and from China’s steady income growth. Each 
observation in this regression is weighted by the square root of the number of origi-
nal observations that its average is based on.
Since age minus cohort equals year plus a constant, in the absence of constraints 
on these dummies, any trend could be the result of different combinations of year, 
age, and cohort effects. Deaton and Paxson (1994) identify age and cohort effects 
by imposing the constraint that the year effects must add up to zero and be orthogo-
nal to a time trend. This constraint forces the decomposition to attribute the rising 
income and consumption over time to age and cohort effects (e.g., younger cohorts 
being much richer than older ones and, for a given cohort, income and consumption 
rising rapidly with age), overwhelming most of the other variation in consumption 
and savings behavior. Our objective is to disentangle differences in savings behavior 
across age and cohort groups, controlling for the rising economy-wide income level. 
Hence, rather than constraining the year effects, we restrict the cohort effects to add 
up to zero and be orthogonal to a trend.16,17 That is, we impose the constraints
16 We are grateful to Deaton for this suggestion.
17 The life cycle hypothesis predicts how consumption should vary with age, but does not have implications 
for how it should vary with the year of birth (after controlling for age and rising incomes over time). Hence, our 
identifying restriction doesn’t prevent us from testing that hypothesis. 
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γ c b = 0.
If the age profile of income is invariant to economic growth (i.e., if economic 
growth raises the lifetime resources of younger cohorts but does not alter the man-
ner in which income is distributed over their life cycle), then income can also be 
expressed as a function of age and lifetime resources.18 We estimate an equation for 
disposable income that is analogous to the one for consumption:
(2)   
____
 ln yab = D aα y + D bγ y + D tθy + εy,
where α y, γy, and θy correspond to the age, cohort, and year effects on income; and 
εy is the error term. Once we have estimated the effects of a variable on consumption 
and income, we can compute its resulting effect on the household savings rate. When 
estimating these equations, we also include the following demographic controls: log 
(family size) and the share of individuals in the household aged 0–4, 5–9, 10–14, 
15–19, and 20 or above.19
B. Age, Cohort, and Time Effects in Household Savings Rates
Figure 6 shows the estimated age and cohort profiles of income, consumption, 
and savings rates. The profile for one type of effect assumes that the others are 
kept constant. We take as our baseline household one in which the head of house-
hold was 25 years old in 1990. For example, the age profile shows how income and 
consumption would vary with age holding the cohort effect constant at the level for 
the cohort born in 1965 and the year effect at its 1990 level (as if it was possible 
to change the age while holding the year and year of birth constant). Similarly, the 
cohort profile shows how income and consumption would vary with year of birth 
holding constant the age effect at its level for 25-year-olds and the year effect at its 
1990 level. Finally, the year profile shows the variation over time holding constant 
the age effect at its level for 25-year-olds and the cohort effect at the level of those 
born in 1965.
The results confirm that consumption (dashed line) tends to track income (solid 
line). The age effects show that income and consumption initially increase with age 
before steadily declining. The implied effect on the savings rate, approximated as 
log (Y) − log (C), is similar to the savings rate profile as a function of age observed 
in the cross-section for the recent years (although the amplitude of the movements 
18 While this may seem at odds with the descriptive plots presented above, the latter combine age with cohort 
and time effects, and are not directly comparable. This separability assumption provides a rough approximation 
for the decomposition of income in a parsimonious manner.
19 Later in the paper, we also control for the share of household members aged 60 or above. We omit that 
control here, as it is correlated with the age of the head of household, one of the main variables of interest in this 
section. We assume that a household headed by an individual with age a will have income and consumption pat-
terns similar to those of an individual of age a. In an earlier version of this paper, we showed that the two variables 
are closely related in our data, except at the tails of the age distribution. 
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Figure 6. Age, Cohort, and Year Effects on Income, Consumption, and Savings Rates
Notes: Effects based on a regression of average log(Y) and log(C) on a vector of age, cohort dummies, and time 
dummies. Cohort dummies constrained to add to zero and be orthogonal to a linear trend. Log(Household Size), 
and share of household members aged 0–4, 5–9, 10–14, 15–19, and 20+ used as controls. Reference household 
is one that was 25 years old in 1990. Each profile displayed holds the other two effects constant at their respec-
tive levels for the baseline household. For example, the age profile shows how income, consumption, and savings 
vary with age, holding the cohort effect constant at its level for households aged 25 in 1990 and the year effect 
constant at its 1990 level.
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is smaller).20 It indicates that young households save substantially, but then savings 
rates gradually decline (by about 10 percentage points), reaching a trough around 
age 45. Savings rates increase rapidly after the age of the household head crosses 
the mid-40s, and remain high even among much older households.21 The increase 
from age 45 to age 65 is about 6 percentage points. This U-shaped pattern of savings 
is highly unusual, and it is a striking departure from the traditional hump-shaped 
pattern found in most other economies. It is also inconsistent with the life-cycle/
permanent income hypothesis.22
The cohort profiles of income, consumption, and savings suggest that younger 
and older cohorts had relatively higher income than those that were in their 20s and 
30s in 1990. The resulting effect on savings suggests that the higher saving cohorts 
are those that were in their 40s and 50s in 1990 (saving about 7.5 percentage points 
more than later cohorts). This is an interesting result, and may be capturing the fact 
that those cohorts may have been particularly hard hit by the reform process and 
bore the brunt of the increase in uncertainty associated with the move toward a mar-
ket economy. The sharp increase in the savings rate in the later working years is also 
consistent with postponing retirement savings until retirement is near, which is the 
optimal response to rapid expected income growth.
It is worth noting that cohorts that were in their 30s in 1990, arguably the ones 
most affected by the one-child policy adopted in the late 1970s, are not high-saving 
cohorts. In fact, their average cohort effect on savings is close to the average for all 
cohorts. This is not to say that the one-child policy had no effect on savings, but, 
simply, that we cannot find a distinct effect on different cohorts based on the time of 
introduction of the policy.23
Finally, we turn to the time profile. As expected, the (unrestricted) time effects 
point to upward trends in income and consumption. Income grows more rapidly 
than consumption, resulting in a strong increasing trend in savings. The time effects 
explain a 9 percentage point increase in the savings rate from 1990 to 2005. This is a 
large figure, particularly considering the host of life-cycle and demographic charac-
teristics we are controlling for. This suggests a limited role for demographic changes 
in explaining the rise in Chinese household savings over the last decade and a half. 
The results were similar when we dropped the controls for family composition or 
dropped cohort effects.
20 This approximation allows us to linearly separate the different effects in the estimated regressions. It yields 
savings rates slightly higher than we would get using 1 − C/Y.
21 Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas and Jonathan A. Parker (2002) estimate that young US households behave as 
buffer-stock savers, and they start to save for retirement when the household head is around age 40. David J. 
McKenzie (2006) finds that precautionary behavior in the face of rising income uncertainty may have reduced the 
incentives for younger cohorts in Taiwan Province of China to borrow in anticipation of rising lifetime incomes. 
22 We reiterate that this pattern cannot be explained simply by rising income and consumption over time, since 
our decomposition already allows for that (through the unrestricted time effects).
23 The one-child policy could still have affected other cohorts. For example, younger cohorts will not be able 
to share the burden of supporting elderly parents with siblings. On the other hand, rapid income growth would 
increase the ability of that single child to support the parents. 
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IV. Potential Explanations
Since demographic shifts related to changes in the relative sizes of cohorts do 
not seem to be able to account for the increase in household savings, we now dis-
cuss a variety of alternative hypotheses that could account for the deviations from 
the predictions of the traditional life-cycle/permanent income hypothesis. We also 
present some data and preliminary evidence of the quantitative relevance of these 
hypotheses in explaining the patterns we have documented. We first investigate these 
hypotheses individually in order to ascertain their empirical relevance before turn-
ing (in Section VI) to a framework that allows us to assess their relative importance.
A. Habit Formation
Habit formation implies that consumption reacts slowly to rising income. This 
could explain why savings rates may increase during a period of rapid income 
growth. This hypothesis has been used to explain why rapidly growing countries 
have high savings rates (Carroll and Weil 1994), but the evidence in favor of it is 
weaker in household data (see, e.g., Karen E. Dynan 2000; Wooheon Rhee 2004).
Ideally, one would like to have panel data to test this hypothesis. The UHS rotates 
one-third of surveyed households out of the sample every year, implying that most 
households are in the survey for three years. This gives us a limited panel compo-
nent to study household consumption behavior. The identification codes for track-
ing households over time are, however, kept consistent only from 2002. Prior to 
that year, household identifier codes were often reset or assigned to replacement 
households when original households dropped out of the survey. Hence, we have to 
match households based on other characteristics as well. We make very conservative 
assumptions to ensure that we are picking up the same households over time, yield-
ing a far smaller sample before 2002.24
Habit formation implies that current consumption growth is positively correlated 
with past consumption growth. Following Dynan (2000), we estimate the following 
equation:
 Δlog (ci,t) = α + βΔlog (ci,t−1) + γi θi,t + εi,t ,
where ∆log (ci,t) is the log-change in nondurables consumption for household i and 
θi,t is a vector of household characteristics.25 We estimate this regression using the 
panel of households in our sample, as well as different pseudo-panels. We restrict 
the sample to households in which the head is 25–69 years old, and exclude those 
in which the head is a student, has lost the ability to work, is unemployed, or is 
waiting for an assignment. Table 3 presents the estimates for the coefficient on 
24 In addition to using the household identifier codes, we ensure matching of household composition and 
characteristics of the household head and spouse (if present) by age (shifted by one year), education level, and 
type of employment.
25 Nondurables consumption is defined as total consumption minus expenditures on durables related to house-
hold appliances, transportation, and educational and recreational goods.
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lagged consumption growth. The first sample covers the households in the 2002–
2005 surveys for which three consecutive observations are available. We initially 
estimate this regression using OLS, and controlling only for levels and changes in 
demographic variables (age, age squared, the log of household size, and shares of 
household members in different age ranges). The estimated coefficient on lagged 
consumption growth is negative (−0.27). That is, when a household experiences 
consumption growth above (conditional) average, it tends to have consumption 
growth below (conditional) average in the following year, and vice versa. The results 
are similar if province,  education, and time dummies are added as controls. This 
pattern is the opposite of what one would expect in the presence of habits. We obtain 
similar results if we consider all consumption expenditures as opposed to focusing 
on nondurable consumption (this applies to all methods and samples in Table 3).
There are two sources of potential bias in these OLS estimates: time averaging 
and measurement error. The first difference of a time-averaged random walk has 
a first-order autocorrelation coefficient that approaches 0.25 as the time averaging 
period becomes large relative to the decision interval (Holbrook Working 1960). 
Since our measure of consumption is a yearly figure, we would expect a positive 
coefficient on lagged consumption growth if instantaneous consumption did follow 
a random walk (and a larger coefficient if there was persistence in consumption 
growth due to habits). If we could properly account for this bias, it would presumably 
increase the absolute magnitude of the negative coefficient on lagged consumption 
growth, which would, in fact, strengthen the evidence against habit formation.
Our estimates may also be influenced by measurement error in consumption, 
which could bias the estimates downward. For example, an unusually high mea-
surement error at time t − 1 would raise the measured ∆log (ci,t−1) and lower the 
measured ∆log (ci,t), contributing to a negative correlation between the two. Suppose 
that consumption, as measured in the survey, is equal to the product of true con-
sumption and a multiplicative measurement error:
 log (ci,t) = log ( c i,t true ) + νi,t ,
in which case the equation being estimated is
 ∆log (ci,t) = α + βΔlog (ci,t−1) + γ i θi,t − νi,t + (1 + β) νi,t−1 − βνi,t−2 + εi,t ,
which is misspecified under OLS.
In order to address this measurement problem, we use the third lag of consump-
tion growth as an instrument for the first lag (the second lag would not be a valid 
instrument since measurement error at t − 2, which would affect both the first and 
second lags of consumption growth, would make it correlated with the errors in the 
second-stage regression). Since our panel covers three years, we can only estimate 
this specification using synthetic cohorts in a pseudo-panel.26
26 If we use lagged income growth as an instrument for lagged consumption growth, we continue to find a 
negative coefficient for the latter (although smaller in absolute magnitude than the OLS coefficients).
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The second sample in Table 3 covers the households in 1992–2001 for which 
three consecutive observations are available. The results are qualitatively similar 
to those in the first sample. Given the relatively limited panel coverage in our data, 
we complement this panel estimation with pseudo-panels. As in Section III, we 
construct the pseudo-panel by averaging the observations from the same cohort of 
households in each year (we take the average of log(c), not the log of the average c). 
We consider cohorts based on: year of birth of the household head, five-year range 
for the year of birth of the household head interacted with province, and five-year 
range for the year of birth of the household head interacted with his or her education 
(six categories) and province. The number of observations increases as we move 
toward finer synthetic cohorts. This comes at the cost of having fewer households 
in each cell. To adjust for this, each observation in the pseudo-panel regressions is 
weighted by the square root of the number of observations that its average is based 
on. All OLS estimates yield a negative coefficient on lagged consumption growth. 
Table 3—Consumption Growth and Habit Formation 
(Dependent variable: nondurable consumption growth)
Regression 
type Controls
Coefficient and SE on lagged 
nondurable 
consumption growth Adj. R2 Observations
Sample: True panel of households (2002–2005)
OLS Demographics –0.268 [0.011] 0.101 5,166
OLS Demographics + prov. + ed. + year –0.272 [0.011] 0.108 5,166
Sample: True panel of households (1992–2001)
OLS Demographics –0.404 [0.021] 0.156 1,919
OLS Demographics + prov. + ed. + year –0.410 [0.021] 0.174 1,919
Sample: Pseudo panel, birth cohorts (1992–2005)
OLS Demographics –0.301 [0.037] 0.279 516
OLS Demographics + year –0.293 [0.040] 0.431 516
IV Demographics + year    0.030 [0.409] 410
Sample: Pseudo panel, birth cohorts (5-year) and province (1992–2005)
OLS Demographics –0.175 [0.038] 0.212 1,116
OLS Demographics + prov. + year –0.197 [0.041] 0.270 1,116
IV Demographics + prov. + year –0.453 [0.341] 889
Sample: Pseudo panel, birth cohorts (5-year) and province and education (1992–2005)
OLS Demographics –0.276 [0.017] 0.176 5,823
OLS Demographics + prov. + ed. + year –0.290 [0.018] 0.200 5,823
IV Demographics + prov. + ed. + year 0.265 [0.149] 4,538
Sample: Fitted consumption growth from pairwise regressions (1992–2005)
OLS Demographics –0.103 [0.003] 0.014 117,824
OLS Demographics + prov. + ed. + year –0.122 [0.003] 0.139 117,824
IV Demographics + prov. + ed. + year –0.298 [0.036] 106,019
Notes: Results reported in this table are from regressions of nondurable consumption growth on lagged nondu-
rable consumption growth. Standard errors are shown in brackets adjacent to the corresponding coefficients. 
Demographic controls include the level and the change in age, age squared, the log of household size, and shares 
of household members aged 0–4, 5–9, 10–14, 15–19, and 60+ (except for the last sample, win which these vari-
ables enter only in levels). Province, education, and year controls are dummies for each of the ten provinces/
municipalities, household head’s educational attainment (six categories), and year. Observations in the true panel 
and last sample are weighted by their sampling weights. Observations in the pseudo-panels are weighted by the 
square root of the number of observations used to construct the averages in each pseudo-panel observation. The 
third lag of consumption growth is used as an instrument for lagged consumption growth in the IV regressions. 
Sample is restricted to households in which the head was aged 25–69, and excludes those in which the head was 
a student, lost the ability to work, was unemployed, or waiting for an assignment.
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Some of the IV estimates yield positive coefficients, but they are not statistically 
significant.27 This may be partly driven by the fact that the instrument used is very 
weak in the first stage (its coefficient is not significant at the 5 percent level in any 
of the regressions, and is only significant at the 10 percent level for the finest of the 
three cohort definitions). While the use of synthetic cohorts can reduce the measure-
ment error due to idiosyncrasies in the way households record their expenditures, it 
creates an additional measurement problem stemming from the fact that different 
households are being averaged together over time to yield the synthetic cohort’s 
consumption measure.28
Finally, to construct the last sample in Table 3, we use consecutive surveys to 
regress the log of nondurable consumption on time dummies interacted with dum-
mies for province; household head’s age (five-year ranges); education; type of own-
ership of the workplace, sector of employment, and type of occupation of the head 
and spouse; and demographic controls. Based on the coefficients for the interaction 
of the different dummies with the second time period, we obtain the fitted consump-
tion growth for a household with those characteristics. The results using this variable 
continue to point to a negative relationship between current and lagged consumption 
growth.
To summarize, our results suggest that habit formation cannot account for the 
savings behavior of households despite the sustained high-income growth. However, 
this evidence remains only suggestive, since measurement problems in consumption 
could be driving these results, and the nature of the data limits our ability to more 
fully address this problem.
In order to gauge the possible effect that habit formation could have on savings 
rates, we use the same synthetic cohorts to regress savings rates, approximated as 
log(income) − log(consumption), on lagged income growth. We use the same controls 
as the regressions above (including time and fixed effects). We consider up to five lags, 
and choose the specification that would yield the largest sum of the point  estimates 
on the lagged income growth variables. Based on these results, a 1 percentage point 
increase in income growth, if sustained, would increase the savings rate by, at most, 
about 0.2 percentage points. While not negligible, that effect appears small (the aver-
age income growth in our sample is about 5.5 percent), although it could also be biased 
downward by measurement problems in income.
B. Shifts in Social Expenditures
Private expenditures on education and health have increased significantly in recent 
years, partly because demand has increased with rising income levels and the aging 
of the population, and partly because the government has been shifting these expen-
ditures to households. Figure 7 shows how the expenditures on health and education 
have varied over time for different age groups. Both have increased substantially 
over time. Education expenditures peak at around age 45 for the household head, 
27 The results were similar when we used GMM estimation.
28 For example, the cohort’s average for a given year may be based on an unusually rich group of households, 
which would increase our measured consumption growth while lowering the one in the following period.
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which could help explain low savings rates for that age group. Health expenditures 
account for a rising share of consumption expenditures, particularly among older 
households. The uncertainty and lumpiness of those expenditures may be driving 
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Figure 7. Average and Standard Deviation of the Shares of Consumption Expenditures on Education 
and Health as a Function of Age of the Head of the Household
Note: The solid line corresponds to average share of consumption expenditures on health (education) and the 
dashed line corresponds to its standard deviation.
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by a selection bias, whereby elders who remain heads of households are, on average, 
better off, and have a higher demand for private health care).29
The fraction of households in our sample for which health expenditures exceed 
20 percent of total consumption expenditures (a reasonable threshold for measuring 
the risk of large private health expenditures) has risen from 1 percent in 1995 to 7 
percent in 2005. To examine the vulnerability of older households, we constructed a 
dummy equal to one if health expenditures exceed this threshold. We then estimate 
a probit for that variable, using, as predictors, the log of nonhealth consumption 
expenditures, demographic controls, and province and year dummies. Our measure 
of a household’s vulnerability to health risk equals 1 if the fitted probability exceeds 
10 percent. For households with at least one individual above the age of 60, this 
measure of vulnerability to health shocks jumps from 0.3 percent in 1995 to 19.1 per-
cent in 2005. We also find that the share of total expenditures devoted to education 
expenditures is highest for households with children in the 15–19 age range (after 
controlling for compositional and other characteristics of the household). Adding 
one child in this age range to a two-person household increases the share of educa-
tion expenditures in total expenditures by about 5 percentage points in 1995. This 
marginal effect increases to nearly 8 percentage points by 2005. In Section V, we 
will formally investigate the effects of these factors on household savings.
C. Durables Purchases and Savings
Even at present, consumer financing remains limited in China.30 As a result, 
instead of borrowing against future income to purchase durable goods, Chinese 
households are more likely to rely on their savings. This could cause households to 
postpone some of those desired purchases, and to save more in the process. The high 
savings rates among young households, in particular, may be driven by the desire to 
finance purchases of major consumer durables (or housing). These expenditures tend 
to be larger for younger households, as would be expected.
We construct a measure of durables consumption using the detailed information 
on consumption expenditures available in the UHS.31 We then use the limited panel 
element of the dataset for the post-2002 period. A regression of the household sav-
ings rate at time t on durable good purchases at time t + 1 suggests a negligible 
impact (results not reported here).
The lack of a relationship between savings and future durable goods purchases is 
not surprising given the high savings rates. On average, Chinese households spent 
7 percent of their disposable incomes on durable goods in 2005. Most households 
29 In the absence of natural experiments, it is difficult to quantify the precautionary savings motives stem-
ming from limited public health insurance. But experiences of other high saving economies can help gauge its 
potential effects. Shin-Yi Chou, Jin-Tan Liu, and James K. Hammitt (2003) estimate that the universalization of 
health insurance in Taiwan Province of China lowered the household savings rate by about 2.5 percentage points. 
30 Total consumer loans issued by all financial institutions in China increased from near zero in 1997 to about 
2.2 trillion yuan by the end of 2005 (12 percent of GDP). Real estate loans account for about 80 percent of total 
consumer loans outstanding and auto loans account for about 7.5 percent of total consumer loans outstanding. 
Household consumption (from the national accounts) amounted to 7 trillion yuan in 2005.
31 Defined as the durable goods components of three broad categories of consumption: household appliances 
and goods and services; transportation; and recreational, educational, and cultural services.
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could have financed such purchases just by saving less during that year, without 
needing to draw on past savings. In 2005, the ninety-fifth percentile of the ratio of 
durables purchases to disposable income was 20 percent, so only the largest (and 
rare) purchases would require a depletion of past savings. Moreover, since a signifi-
cant share of Chinese households’ wealth is in liquid assets, such as bank deposits, 
even large purchases could be financed by drawing on those liquid savings.
Table 4 reports the ownership rates for some of the major durable goods in urban 
China. These are surprisingly high considering average income levels, with the nota-
ble exception of automobiles (only 3.4 per 100 households owned an automobile in 
2005). Automobile purchases are likely to become more common as Chinese house-
holds become increasingly affluent. The net effect on savings is, however, hard to 
predict, as it will depend on the rate of increase in the demand for cars (which could 
increase the saving rate in the cross-section if households have to self-finance auto 
purchases) versus the rate of development of consumer financing for cars.
D. Housing Purchases and Savings
The most important “durable good” is housing. Table 5 shows the average home 
ownership rate for the households in our sample. The proportion of households that 
own or partially own their homes increased dramatically from 17 percent in 1990 
to 86 percent in 2005 (the increase in the full UHS sample is very similar), largely 
as a result of the housing reforms that took place over the last decade. In the past, 
housing was often provided by state enterprises to their employees. As part of the 
housing reform, much of that stock was sold to the workers, typically at below mar-
ket rates. In 2005, 58 percent of the households in our sample that owned or partially 
owned a home had purchased it through the housing reform. Figure 8 (left panel) 
plots average home ownership rates by age group. The home ownership rate among 
households with heads aged 25–35 years is nearly identical to that for the average 
household. Figure 8 (right panel) plots, by age group, the share of households in 
2005 that bought their homes through the housing reform. As expected, a smaller 
share of the younger households obtained their home through the housing reform 
(for example, 40 percent of households headed by 25–35 year olds, compared with 
57 percent for the full sample average).
This privatization of the housing stock could help explain rising household 
savings rates, since home purchase and construction expenditures are considered 
household savings. Table 5 also reports the ratio of home purchase and construction 
Table 4—Ownership of Durable Goods per 100 Urban Households
Durable good 2000 2005
Washing machine 90.8 95.5
Refrigerator 80.5 90.7
Color TV 116.7 134.8
DVD player 37.1 68.1
Mobile phone 18.3 137.0
Automobile 0.63 3.4
Source: CEIC (based on NBS Urban Household Survey data—full sample).
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expenditures to disposable income. That ratio has averaged about 6.5 percent in the 
last 10years. We estimate how much of those expenditures were financed by deplet-
ing past savings by computing the average of:
Min [Housing purchase and construction expenditures, Saving deposit withdrawals].
If a household did not have any housing purchase or construction expenditures 
in a given year, as is typically the case, this variable will equal zero. If the house-
hold had positive housing purchase and construction expenditures in that year, this 
variable will equal the lower of that expenditure and its savings withdrawals. Thus, 
this variable shows approximately how much of the observed housing purchase and 
construction expenditure could have been financed by savings withdrawals.32
32 We implicitly assume that the withdrawals were used to finance the house purchase, which seems reason-
able since a household is unlikely to buy a house following an adverse shock to its income. Moreover, such a 
household could have smoothed its (nonhousing) consumption by postponing or adjusting the house purchase/
construction expenditure instead of depleting its savings. 





































1990 17.0 0.8 0.3 0.0 0.3 13.3
1991 18.5 1.2 0.7 0.1 0.3  9.9
1992 16.6 2.4 1.5 0.1 0.5  6.9
1993 20.6 3.8 2.5 0.2 1.4  7.5
1994 28.3 5.6 3.7 0.1 1.4  7.6
1995 30.9 2.3 1.4 0.1 1.4  7.4
1996 35.5 4.2 3.0 0.1 1.2  7.5
1997 47.7 4.2 2.8 0.2 1.3 13.0
1998 55.4 8.4 6.3 0.3 1.3 12.3
1999 64.6 7.1 5.2 0.2 0.9 22.2
2000 72.7 6.9 4.9 0.5 1.8 16.7
2001 76.7 6.0 4.1 0.6 2.3 17.5
2002 79.5 6.5 4.5 0.7 2.7 18.7
2003 79.9 7.0 4.4 1.1 3.5 20.1
2004 83.5 8.0 5.4 1.4 4.0 21.4
2005 86.0 6.6 4.5 1.7 5.2 20.0
Notes: High ownership rates partly reflect the housing reform. For example, 65 percent of the households that 
owned a home in 2005 purchased it through the housing reform. All ratios reported are based on the ratio of the 
averages of each variable (not the average of the ratios). Min(home purchase or construction expenditures, sav-
ings withdrawals) is a measure of how much of the observed home purchase and construction expenditures were 
financed from saving withdrawals. For example, if a household draws down its savings but does not report any 
such expenditure, the value is zero. If a household reports a home purchase or construction expenditure, this vari-
able is the smaller of the expenditure and the saving withdrawal (in the latter case, we assume that the entire with-
drawal is used to finance the housing expenditure).
116 AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL: MACROECONOMICS JANUARY 2010
In order to gauge the magnitude of housing-related savings, we take the ratio of 
this variable (including the majority of observations for which its value is zero) to 
the average disposable income in that year. This ratio suggests that in recent years 
aggregate housing purchase/construction related savings withdrawals correspond to 
about 5 percent of aggregate household income, up from 2 percent in the period 
1990–1995.33 Of course, that ratio is much higher if we focus only on households 
reporting nonzero home construction and purchase expenditures. For that group, our 
estimate of housing-related savings withdrawals corresponded to over 120 percent 
of those households’ incomes in 2005, up from an average of about 25 percent in the 
period 1990–1995. We cannot specifically identify households that purchase a house 
(or constructed a new unit) in a given year. But, if we further restrict the sample to 
households for which construction and purchase expenditures exceed consumption 
in a given year, our estimate of housing-related savings withdrawals would corre-
spond to 200 percent of income in 2005, up from an average of about 60 percent 
in the period 1990–1995. These calculations suggest that the rapid privatization of 
the housing stock contributed significantly to the rising savings rates over the last 
decade and a half.
Table 5 also reports the ratio of the average repayment of home loans with respect 
to the average income. That ratio is small since the proportion of households that 
have used mortgage financing and are repaying a home loan is still low, standing at 
only 5 percent in 2005 (that proportion is 11 percent among households in which 
the head is 25–35 years old). But while relatively few households are repaying home 
loans, the ones that are making repayments devote a substantial share of their income 
to those payments (20 percent in 2005). Unfortunately, we cannot separate interest 
payments (which should not be considered savings) from amortization of principal 
on those loans.
33 To the extent that the real return on savings is lower than average real income growth, this ratio will, in fact, 
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Figure 8. Home Ownership by Age of the Head of Household
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If home ownership motives have been an important contributor to savings, the 
high ownership rates that have now been attained point to a potential decline in sav-
ings rates in the near future. But anecdotal evidence suggests that many households 
would like to upgrade their living conditions (which seems particularly  relevant for 
owners of older units obtained through the housing reform) and that, despite the high 
home ownership rate, the housing market in China remains very active. We explore 
the empirical implications in Section V. This discussion indicates that developments 
in mortgage markets could affect household savings behavior. Perhaps more impor-
tantly, if households were able to tap their illiquid housing wealth, the need for 
precautionary savings would decline (since, in the event of an adversity, households 
would be able to borrow against their housing equity, using the house as collateral).
E. Effects of State Enterprise Restructuring on Saving Behavior
Increased precautionary saving due to uncertainties stemming from China’s tran-
sition to a market economy could potentially help explain the increase in saving.34 
The high savings rates among young households may be driven by the need to build 
an adequate buffer stock of savings to smooth adverse shocks to their income. This 
factor could also explain why we find that the higher saving cohorts are those that 
were in their 40s and 50s in 1990. These cohorts bore much of the increase in uncer-
tainty related to the move toward a market economy, and do not have as many years 
of rapid income growth ahead as the younger cohorts to reap the benefits of those 
reforms. Moreover, they may have found themselves in a situation where their past 
savings were no longer appropriate in an environment of increased uncertainty, and, 
as a result, had to re-evaluate their savings plans and make up for past savings that 
were not made.
It is difficult to quantify the magnitude of the effect of uncertainty on savings 
using repeated cross-sections of micro data, however, since that increase in aggregate 
uncertainty affects all households (and we need some variation across households 
in order to identify an effect). But insights can be obtained by analyzing variations 
in saving behavior across different groups of households that faced different dimen-
sions of this “transition risk.”
One relevant dimension is based on State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) employment. 
In most economies, SOE employment is likely to be more stable so, all else being 
equal, workers employed in the state sector should save less. In the case of China, 
concerns related to SOE reforms could have contributed to an increase in savings 
rates of households reliant on SOE labor income relative to other households. An 
implicit assumption underlying this argument is that, while the level of uncer-
tainty may be higher in the private sector and overall macro uncertainty may have 
increased, the relative increase in uncertainty has been greater for SOE employees.35
34 Nicola Fuchs-Schündeln (2008) finds that the precautionary motive plays an important role in explaining 
the saving behavior of East German households around the time of German reunification. 
35 Prior to the SOE reforms, workers received a number of housing, health, education, and pension benefits 
through their employer. As some benefits are reduced, or their future becomes more uncertain due to SOE restruc-
turing, households have stronger motives to save.
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How large could this effect be? The restructuring of state enterprises has been 
accompanied by an erosion in the share of employment accounted for by SOEs and 
collective units and an increase in the share of the private sector. Table 6 shows that, 
among heads of household in the 25–59 age range, SOEs accounted for 78 percent 
of employment in 1995. This share had dropped to 54 percent by 2005. The drop in 
SOE employment is similarly large (from 68 to 43 percent) if we also consider other 
household members. Hence, by comparing the savings of SOE and non-SOE house-
holds over time, we can gauge whether the shift in employment patterns, and the 
uncertainties induced by SOE restructuring, can help account for the rising savings 
rates. That estimation, which is discussed in greater detail in Section V, suggests that 
this factor is statistically significant, but quantitatively not very important.
F. Target Savings
Another possible explanation for why Chinese household savings rates have risen 
from already high levels, even as real interest rates have turned negative, is the target 
saving hypothesis. The basic idea is that households have a target level of savings 
that they want to achieve by the end of their working life, which means that savings 
rates will tend to be negatively correlated with the real returns on savings. This is, 
of course, just a way of restating the relative importance of substitution and income 
effects of changes in interest rates on intertemporal consumption decisions. The 
usual presumption is that the substitution effect dominates, so that a lower real rate 
of return on savings leads to a lower savings rate.
It is difficult to test this hypothesis using time series data since the span of avail-
able data is limited and the economy has been undergoing numerous changes over 
the last decade and a half. It is also difficult to test this at the household level since 
different households may face different rates of return on their savings, depending 
on the composition of their financial wealth. We do not have this information in our 
dataset.
Given these constraints, we devise an indirect test by exploiting cross-province 
differences in inflation rates. The vast majority of household financial savings takes 
Table 6—Type of Employer for Households with a Head in the Age Range 25–59 
(all figures in percentage terms)
Heads of household All members
Type of employer 1995 2000 2005 1995 2000 2005
SOEs 77.6 70.7 54.4 67.8 61.9 42.9
Collective units 11.9 9.3 4.5 18.0 12.2 6.1
Other types of units
 (including private)
1.5 4.6 11.7 1.7 5.3 11.9
Entrepreneurs 0.5 2.9 7.8 1.0 3.1 6.7
Employees of individuals 0.3 1.3 6.5 0.8 3.1 9.2
Re-employed retirees 1.5 1.7 2.3 1.3 1.8 2.6
Other employed 0.1 0.5 2.9 0.4 1.1 4.3
Retirees 6.5 8.8 9.7 8.5 10.9 14.7
Other 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.6 1.7
Notes: Breakdown excludes households in which the head is a student, has lost the ability to work, is unemployed, 
or is waiting for an assignment. Breakdown among household members also excludes those categories.
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the form of bank deposits and, since the deposit rate is fixed by the central bank, 
all households face the same nominal rate of return on their savings. Thus, inflation 
differentials across provinces can be interpreted as a proxy for differences in real 
interest rates.
We use published UHS data on per capita income and consumption averages for 
31 mainland provinces/municipalities for the period 1992–2006 (yielding a total of 
421 observations). We regress the provincial/municipality average savings rate on 
the log of the average disposable income, the ex-post one-year-ahead inflation rate, 
province dummies, and year dummies (to capture differences in the nominal interest 
rate across years and trends in savings). Our estimates indicate that a 1 percentage 
point increase in the 1-year-ahead ex-post inflation rate is associated with an increase 
of 0.24 percentage points (standard error: 0.08) in the household savings rate. This 
correlation provides some indirect support for the view that lower real interest rates 
are associated with higher savings rates.36 We re-estimated the regression using our 
10-province sample, which yields similar results (0.22; standard error: 0.13).
These results should, of course, be interpreted with caution, as there are other rea-
sons why expected inflation could affect savings. Furthermore, by construction, we 
can tease out only a cross-province effect rather than an aggregate nationwide effect 
of a change in interest rates on savings. Even if taken at face value, our point esti-
mates suggest that the effect is not quantitatively important. For example, based on 
the province-level results, it would take an inflation rate 4 percentage points above 
the national average in that year to raise provincial saving rates by 1 percentage 
point. Thus, even if our estimated correlation held up at the national level, it would 
not explain the large (and rising) household national saving rates. Hence, we do not 
pursue this further here. Nevertheless, we find it intriguing that, based on our rather 
crude and indirect test, we cannot refute the target savings hypothesis altogether.
V. A Composite Sketch
We now develop an estimation framework for jointly analyzing the importance 
of some of the key hypotheses in driving the increase in the household savings rate. 
The evidence in Section IV suggests that savings for durables purchases, consump-
tion persistence due to habit formation, and target savings behavior are not major 
contributors to this increase. Hence, we begin by focusing on the other motives for 
saving that seem quantitatively most relevant: housing purchases, shifts in social 
expenditures, and SOE restructuring.
We estimate composite median regressions (quantile regressions estimated at the 
median) for the household savings rate using the following controls.
Demographics.—Dummies are for the age of the head of household being 25–29, 
30–34, … , 60–64, and 65–69 years old; the log of the household size; and the share 
of household members aged 0–4, 5–9, 10–14, 15–19, 20–59, and 60 or above. These 
controls can inform us about how the presence of elderly persons and children of 
36 Detailed estimation results are available from the authors. The estimated coefficient on the log of disposable 
income is 0.16, which is in line with the other estimates in this paper.
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different ages affect savings, helping us to gauge savings motives related to future 
expenditures on health and education.
Income.—The log of disposable income. We also include dummies for the educa-
tion, occupation, and industry of the household head and the spouse (if present), and 
province and year dummies. These dummies can capture, among other things, the 
permanent income of a household with given characteristics. Thus, when reading the 
coefficient on log income, one should bear in mind that the estimated effect includes 
these other controls.
SOE Employment.—This effect is captured by two dummies. The first equals one 
if there is one SOE employee in the household, and the second equals one if there 
are two or more SOE employees in the household. This specification allows us to 
capture possible nonlinearities in the effect—i.e., for a given level of income, the 
marginal effect could be different depending on whether some or all of the house-
hold’s labor income comes from the SOE sector.37
Home Ownership.—A dummy equal to one if the household owns its dwelling.
Health Risk.—The measure of vulnerability to large health expenditures described 
in Section IVB. It is essentially a dummy variable that takes the value unity if the 
fitted probability (from a first-stage probit) of a large health expenditure exceeds 10 
percent.38
Table 7 presents the regression results. To abstract from year-to-year variations, 
we present results for the following periods: 1992–1996, 1997–2001, and 2002–
2005. For each period, we present the results from a specification including only the 
income and demographic controls (and also year and province dummies), and then 
a second specification that also controls for SOE employment, home ownership, and 
health expenditure risk. Since we use fitted values of the health expenditure risk as 
a control in these regressions, we bootstrap the data in both stages to adjust the stan-
dard errors in the relevant specifications of this table.
It is worth noting that the estimated year dummies (not reported in the table for 
presentation purposes) do not imply a rising trend. That is, changes in the variables 
that we consider in our regressions can explain the rising savings rate. For example, 
if we drop year dummies altogether, the fitted values from specification (1) would 
imply a median savings rate of 24 percent in 2005, which is slightly above the level 
of 22 percent observed in the data.
37 The results that we report here were similar if, instead of these dummies for SOE employment, we used the 
share of household income from SOE earnings as a regressor. Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln (2005) note that 
differences in risk aversion could result in self-selection into occupations with different risk characteristics, which 
could affect estimates of precautionary saving behavior. 
38 Note that this dummy structure is more appropriate than adding the fitted probability as a control in the 
main regression, since the latter’s effect is nonlinear (once a household faces a sufficiently high probability of 
that risk, it should start provisioning for it). It is possible that households start saving in advance of health risk 
but, since such anticipatory behavior is likely to be closely correlated with age, we cannot disentangle it from the 
overall life-cycle effects that we estimate with age dummies. 
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The effect of income on the savings rate has grown stronger over time. All else 
being equal, a 1 percent increase in disposable income increases savings rates by 0.17 
to 0.19 percentage points in the period 2002–2005 (up from about 0.15 in the period 
1992–1996). This higher saving propensity of richer households, combined with rapid 
income growth, may seem like a promising explanation for the increase in savings. 
Table 7—Median Regressions for the Savings Rate
1992–1996 1997–2001 2002–2005
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log (income) 0.148 0.145 0.154 0.167 0.173 0.194
[0.007] [0.007] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.007]
1 SOE worker 0.008 0.004 0.004
[0.006] [0.004] [0.004]
2 or more SOE workers 0.018 0.013 0.012
[0.005] [0.005] [0.005]
Health risk 0.320 0.154 0.202
[0.073] [0.011] [0.011]
Owns home 0.021 0.023 –0.005
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004]
Age 30–34 0.000 –0.001 –0.007 –0.007 –0.003 –0.010
[0.009] [0.010] [0.012] [0.011] [0.010] [0.018]
Age 35–39 –0.003 –0.005 –0.037 –0.038 –0.010 –0.015
[0.009] [0.010] [0.010] [0.01] [0.011] [0.016]
Age 40–44 –0.003 –0.006 –0.039 –0.043 –0.009 –0.012
[0.010] [0.011] [0.010] [0.011] [0.01] [0.016]
Age 45–49 0.003 0.001 –0.039 –0.039 –0.010 –0.013
[0.011] [0.012] [0.010] [0.011] [0.011] [0.014]
Age 50–54 0.026 0.023 –0.027 –0.030 0.011 –0.008
[0.012] [0.012] [0.010] [0.011] [0.011] [0.016]
Age 55–59 0.003 0.005 –0.013 –0.037 0.023 –0.042
[0.015] [0.015] [0.010] [0.011] [0.013] [0.019]
Age 60–64 0.019 0.017 0.006 –0.002 –0.007 –0.101
[0.02] [0.022] [0.013] [0.015] [0.019] [0.029]
Age 65–69 –0.011 0.003 0.008 –0.002 –0.005 –0.108
[0.055] [0.055] [0.016] [0.022] [0.020] [0.032]
Log household size –0.072 –0.076 –0.037 –0.045 –0.098 –0.087
[0.012] [0.011] [0.006] [0.007] [0.013] [0.011]
Share aged 0–4 –0.007 –0.003 –0.019 –0.004 –0.021 –0.076
[0.030] [0.030] [0.023] [0.023] [0.025] [0.025]
Share aged 5–9 –0.003 0.001 –0.069 –0.040 –0.021 –0.012
[0.025] [0.025] [0.022] [0.022] [0.017] [0.017]
Share aged 10–14 –0.053 –0.047 –0.076 –0.038 –0.054 –0.043
[0.021] [0.021] [0.017] [0.017] [0.017] [0.017]
Share aged 15–19 –0.062 –0.057 –0.154 –0.113 –0.138 –0.134
[0.017] [0.017] [0.020] [0.020] [0.013] [0.013]
Share aged 60 plus –0.006 0.001 0.008 –0.040 0.054 –0.039
[0.021] [0.021] [0.012] [0.012] [0.014] [0.014]
Observations 21,926 21,926 29,366 29,366 53,403 53,403
Notes: Health risk indicates a (fitted) 10 percent or higher probability of an annual health expenditure of 20 per-
cent or more of total consumption expenditures. Bootstrapped standard errors are in brackets. All specifications 
include dummies for the head and spouse education (6 categories), occupation (9 categories), and industry of 
employment (16 categories). Sample is restricted to households in which the head was aged 25–69, and excludes 
those in which the head was a student, lost the ability to work, was unemployed, or waswaiting for an assignment.
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But, one should bear in mind that this coefficient is capturing the effect of income after 
controlling for a host of household characteristics (e.g., education, occupation, prov-
ince, and year, among others), so one cannot simply multiply this coefficient by income 
growth to read an effect on the savings rate. But, this rising coefficient does suggest 
that, all else being equal, households tend to save more of the idiosyncratic compo-
nents of their income, which is consistent with stronger precautionary saving motives.
The age dummies confirm that households with relatively very young or very old 
heads tend to save more, although the magnitude of the difference in savings is more 
muted than the age effects estimated in Section III. This suggests other controls may 
be capturing the differences by age shown in those plots (for example, high savings 
among the young being partly captured by their higher income levels). One striking 
feature of our results is how strongly the introduction of the health risk variable 
affects the demographic controls related to old age in the 2002–2005 sample. For 
example, the results in column 5 indicate that a household consisting of two adults 
in the age range of 65–69 would have saved, all else equal, 5 percentage points 
more than a household consisting of two adults in the age range of 25–29. But in the 
specification with the health risk control (column 6), the difference due to the demo-
graphic dummies goes from plus 5 percentage points to minus 14 percentage points.
The reason for this change is that the health risk dummy (which mainly applies to 
older households) has almost a 20 percentage point effect on the savings rate.39 Once 
we factor in the effect of the health risk on savings, an older household for which that 
risk is present will still save 5 percentage points more of its income than the younger 
household (i.e., this control does not alter the fact that the elderly save more. It just 
attributes that higher savings to a health motive as opposed to demographic controls). 
While the magnitude of the coefficient on health risk in column 6 is actually compara-
ble to the one in the earlier samples (columns 2 and 4), the importance of that variable 
in the 1992–1996 sample is, in fact, negligible. The health risk dummy was equal to 1 
for only 0.2 percent of the households in that period, compared to 8 and 16.8 percent 
of the households in the period 1997–2001 and 2002–2005, respectively. This explains 
why the inclusion of that control has such a small effect on elderly savings when going 
from regression (1) to regression (2), compared to the change from regressions (3) and 
(4), and, particularly, the large change from regression (5) to regression (6).
While we do not have controls directly related to education expenditures, their 
importance can be gauged by the household composition controls. For example, we 
can compare households with children aged 5–9 and 10–14 years with those aged 
15–19 for which education expenditures tend to be higher. All else being equal, a 
3 person household with one child in the 5–9 age group saved about 2 percentage 
points more of its income than one with a member in the 15–19 age group in the 
period 1992–1996, and 4 percentage points more in the period 2002–2005. If we 
compare the 10–14 age group with the 15–19 age group, the difference is negligible 
in the period 1992–1996, and it is 3 percentage points in the period 2002–2005.40 
39 While we add three additional controls when going from specification (5) to specification (6), the effect 
on the savings rate of the elderly is driven almost entirely by the health risk control (which is also clear from the 
magnitudes of the other two controls). 
40 For these comparisons, we divide the difference between the respective coefficients on the household com-
position dummies by three (since we shift the age group of one member in a three-person household). We chose 
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This pattern is consistent with higher savings in anticipation of future education 
expenditures (and with a dip in savings when education expenditures tend to be 
highest). Note that while education can explain why some households save more than 
others, the effects on aggregate savings may be muted (as the savings of one group 
are compensated by the dissavings of the other). This may not be the case for health 
related savings given the more lumpy and uncertain nature of those expenditures.41
As discussed earlier, we use differentials in savings rates between SOE and non-
SOE employees to tease out the magnitude of precautionary motives for saving. Our 
maintained assumption is that, while overall macro uncertainty has increased and 
the level of uncertainty may be higher in the private sector, the relative increase in 
uncertainty has been greater for SOE employees due to restructuring. Having one 
SOE employee in the household increases the savings rate by almost 1 percentage 
point in the period 1992–1996, but only by half of a percentage point in the period 
2002–2005. Having 2 or more SOE employees raises savings rates by about 2 per-
centage points in the first period. In the later periods, that effect declines to about 
1 percentage point. This suggests that SOE reforms, by themselves, do not account 
for a significant portion of the increase in aggregate savings rates. Of course, our 
results have little to say about the effects of aggregate uncertainty on savings rates. 
One could argue that, in theory, SOE households should be saving substantially less 
than their private counterparts, and the fact that they save slightly more, on average, 
already suggests strong precautionary motives from the reform process. Without 
knowing what the counterfactual savings rates would have been, however, it is dif-
ficult to assess the overall impact of SOE reforms on saving behavior.
Finally, we turn to the home ownership dummy. Households that own their homes 
save about 2 percentage points more of their income in the period 1992–1996 and 
1997–2001 than those that do not own their own homes. The sign is the opposite 
of what one would expect based on our contention of households saving for house 
purchases. This effect disappears in the 2002–2005 sample.
Panel A of Table 8 presents estimates for the same regressions as the ones above, 
but with income and consumption adjusted by an estimated value of owner-occu-
pied housing obtained by regressing, for the sample of renters, rent expenditures on 
nonrent consumption expenditures, demographic controls, and province and SOE 
employment dummies (since SOE workers often had access to subsidized housing). 
We then use the fitted values to impute rents for the homeowners. Again, we boot-
strap the data (in both stages) to construct the standard errors. We continue to esti-
mate a positive effect of home ownership on savings rates in the period 1992–1996 
and 1997–2001 (columns 1 and 2), but the effect is now minus 2 percentage points 
for 2002–2005 (column 3). For comparability with the previous samples, we have 
used our estimates for the rental values of owner-occupied homes in the period 
to use the 5–9 age group rather than the 0–4 age group as the basis for comparison since saving behavior may 
be atypical following the birth of a child. There has also been an increase in health expenditures among families 
with small children. The average value of the health expenditure risk dummy in 2005 is 0.38 for families with 
children aged 0–4, but only 0.09 for families with children aged 5–9. In 1995, those figures were 0.02 and 0.00, 
respectively. This may explain why the coefficient on the share of household members aged 0–4 becomes so nega-
tive in the period 2002–2005 from specification (5) to specification (6).
41 For example, many households may be compelled to accumulate savings, but relatively few may actually get 
hit by health shocks so the net effect can increase aggregate savings.
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2002–2005, even though those surveys do report imputed rent values. Using the 
reported, rather than the estimated values, increases the coefficient on the home 
ownership dummy to minus 1 percentage point (column 5).
The 2002–2005 surveys report an estimated value of the dwellings at market 
prices. We use that variable to create dummies for value quartiles (by province and 
year). Column 4 reports the results of a regression including those dummies. Having 
a home in the bottom quartile raises the savings rate by 1.5 percentage points, and 
one in the second quartile by 0.3 percentage points. Having a home in the third and 
top quartiles lowers the savings rate by 1.6 and 3.9 percentage points, respectively 
(after controlling for income and other household characteristics used in the regres-
sion). If we use the imputed rents reported in the 2002–2005 surveys instead of the 
ones we construct (column 6), the estimated effects of owning a home in the bottom 
and second quartiles imply increases in the savings rate of 2.4 and 0.8 percentage 
points, respectively. Owning a home in the third and top quartiles continues to lower 
the savings rate by 1.4 and 3.9 percentage points, respectively.
As noted in Section IV, anecdotal evidence suggests much of the privatized hous-
ing stock is unappealing, and many households may be saving to improve/purchase 
new dwellings. This is consistent with the results from this last regression, whereby 
households in higher valued homes save substantially less than those that do not 
own a home or live in one of low value. Unfortunately, the estimated housing value 
variable is not available in earlier surveys (so, we cannot test whether this is what is 
driving the housing-related results in those years).
The effects of home ownership on savings may depend on the age of the house-
hold head. For example, a young household head who does not own a dwelling is 
more likely than a 65 year old to be saving to purchase one. Panel B of Table 8 
presents regressions similar to those of panel A, but with interactions of the home 
ownership dummy with dummies for five-year ranges of the age of the household 
head (the 25–29 age group dummy is omitted). Home ownership continues to have 
a positive effect on savings rates in the period 1992–1996, and 1997–2001, although 
the coefficients on the age interactions are not statistically significant (columns 1–2).
The expected pattern does emerge in the 2002–2005 sample, where home owner-
ship implies a large reduction in savings for younger households, but not for older 
ones (column 3). In that sample, the coefficient on the home ownership dummy is 
−7.6 percentage points. But the coefficients on its interaction with age are positive, 
and the combined effect gradually declines as we move from the 25–29 age group 
toward older households. The point estimates imply effects of −4.7, −3.3, and −2.5 
percentage points for 30–34, 35–39, and 40–44-year-old household heads, respec-
tively (with the effect for 30–34-year-olds not being statistically significantly differ-
ent than the one for 25–29-year-olds). For the 45–49 year old and older age groups, 
the effect of home ownership on savings seems to fade. The point estimates still 
imply a negative effect for 50–54-year-old household heads, and a positive effect 
for the older households (but we cannot reject the hypothesis of zero effect of home 
ownership on savings among the elderly). The results are similar when the imputed 
rents reported in the survey are used (column 4).
The results are also similar if we interact the age of the household head with home 
ownership by housing quartile (not reported in Table 8). Using the fitted imputed 
VOL. 2 NO. 1 125CHAMON AND PRASAD: WHY ARE SAVING RATES IN CHINA RISING?
Table 8—Median Regressions for the Saving Rate Including Imputed Value 
 of Owner-Occupied Housing
Imp. rents from regression Imp. rents from survey
1992–1996 1998–2001 2002–2005 2002–2005  2002–2005 2002–2005
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6)
Panel A. Dummy for home ownership
Log (income) 0.144 0.166 0.201 0.211 0.197 0.21
[0.004] [0.005] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004]
Owns home 0.018 0.019 –0.017 –0.009
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.004]
Own home 0.015 0.024
Value Q1 [0.004] [0.004]
Own home 0.003 0.008
Value Q2 [0.004] [0.004]
Own home –0.016 –0.014
Value Q3 [0.004] [0.004]
Own home –0.039 –0.039
Value Q4 [0.004] [0.004]
Observations 29,464 29,549 70,504 70,504  70,501 70,501
Panel B. Dummy for home ownership interacted with age dummies
Log (income) 0.144 0.167 0.203 0.198
[0.004] [0.005] [0.004] [0.004]
Owns home 0.03 0.002 –0.076 –0.064
[0.014] [0.014] [0.02] [0.02]
Owns home × age 30–34 –0.014 0.02 0.029 0.028
[0.017] [0.017] [0.024] [0.023]
Owns home × age 35–39 –0.015 0.025 0.043 0.037
[0.016] [0.016] [0.022] [0.023]
Owns home × age 40–44 –0.009 0.015 0.051 0.046
[0.014] [0.017] [0.022] [0.021]
Owns home × age 45–49 –0.013 0.014 0.072 0.066
 [0.017] [0.017] [0.019] [0.021]
Owns home × age 50–54 –0.012 0.017 0.06 0.055
[0.018] [0.018] [0.021] [0.022]
Owns home × age 55–59 0.005 0.034 0.091 0.087
[0.017] [0.019] [0.023] [0.022]
Owns home × age 60–64 –0.018 0.007 0.075 0.072
[0.017] [0.019] [0.029] [0.028]
Owns home × age 65–69 –0.014 0.007 0.092 0.083
[0.02] [0.021] [0.026] [0.026]
Observations 29,464 29,549 70,504   70,501  
Notes: Regressions include same controls as the regressions in columns 2, 4, and 6 of Table 7, but only selected 
coefficients are reported here. Savings rates and income are adjusted by the imputed values of owner-occupied 
housing. Imputed values are obtained by regressing rents on nonrent consumption, demographic controls, and 
province dummies for each year. Bootstrapped standard errors are in brackets. Own home value Q1 is a dummy 
equal to one if the value of the home (available only in the 2002–2005 surveys) is in the bottom quartile of the 
owner-occupied homes in the respective province. Own home value Q2, Q3, and Q4 are the corresponding dum-
mies for the second, third, and top quartiles. In panel B, interactions of home ownership with age are omitted for 
age 25–29, so effect of home ownership for 25–29-year-old household heads is given by “owns home,” and com-
bined effect for other age groups is given by the sum of “own home” with their respective age group interaction 
term.
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rents, for a household with its head in the 25–29 age range, the point estimates imply 
a negative effect on savings of 4.7, 6.3, 7.0, and 7.7 percentage points for houses in 
the bottom, second, third, and top quartiles of home values, respectively. The results 
are, again, similar if we use the imputed rents from the survey (the point estimates 
for 25–29 year olds imply declines of 2.9, 4.6, 6.1, and 7.2 percentage points as we 
move from the bottom to the top quartile of home values).42
For completeness, we augmented our baseline regressions with variables to cap-
ture the effects of habit formation (lagged consumption growth) and target savings 
(nominal deposit rates deflated by province-specific inflation rates). The coefficients 
on these variables were small, confirmed the results of the univariate analysis in 
Section IV, and did not affect the other coefficients by much.43
VI. Discussion and Implications for Aggregate Savings Patterns
To conclude, we review our main findings and discuss their implications in light 
of other macroeconomic data. Despite rapid income growth and prospects of sus-
tained high income growth, the urban household savings rate in China has risen by 
about 7 percentage points over the period 1995–2005. This is not consistent with 
the predictions of the standard version of the permanent income life cycle hypoth-
esis. We find that demographic factors play, at best, a minor role in explaining this 
increase. After controlling for time and cohort effects, we find a surprising U-shaped 
age-savings profile, with households headed by young persons and those headed by 
old persons having the highest savings rates. This is different from the traditional 
hump-shaped age-savings profiles that have been estimated for most countries (and 
that we see even for China in the late 1980s and early 1990s).
Taken at face value, the estimated age profile of savings suggests negligible 
changes in the savings rate as China’s population ages, since both the young and the 
old have among the highest savings rates (so population aging would just replace one 
group of high savers with another). Combining our estimated age profile of savings 
for the 25–69 age group with UN projections for the evolution of the Chinese popu-
lation (Figure 9) implies a change of less than 0.2 percentage points in the average 
savings rate from the present to 2050.44 Of course, the age-profile of savings that we 
have found in Chinese data is unusual, and could well have been influenced by one-
off effects of China’s transition to a market economy.
Habit formation considerations could, in theory, help explain the rise in savings 
rates during a period of high income growth, but we do not find evidence supporting 
that channel. The massive privatization of the housing stock seems a more promising 
42 We also experimented with interactions of the SOE employment dummies with age, but the coefficients 
were noisy and not statistically significant. We could not meaningfully estimate the interaction of the health risk 
variable with age, since age is one of the main variables used when constructing that risk measure.
43 The coefficients on lagged consumption growth still tend to have a mild negative effect on savings. Using 
the subsample of households with 3 consecutive observations, a 10 percent increase in lagged consumption growth 
would raise savings by 0.2 percentage points in the period 1992–1996, and lower savings by 0.4 and 0.7 percentage 
points in the periods 1997–2001 and 2002–2005, respectively. The coefficients on provincial inflation suggest that 
a 1 percentage point decline in the real rate of return would increase saving rates by 0.15–0.35 percentage points.
44 This back-of-the-envelope exercise involves a number of simplifying assumptions. It ignores the fact that the 
age profiles estimated are for the head of the household, while the projected population shares are for individuals. 
Moreover, our estimates are based on urban households, whereas the demographic projections also cover rural areas.
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explanation for this surge in savings, with simple back-of-the-envelope calculations 
suggesting that savings driven by the motive of home ownership could account for 
about 3 percentage points of the increase in the household savings rate from ther 
period 1995–2005. Since this is a one-off event (albeit one that has been playing out 
over several years), the proportion of savings driven by this factor should decline 
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Figure 9. Age Distribution of the Chinese Population: Estimates and Projections
Source: U.N. Population Division
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behavior between households that own their dwellings and those that rent suggests a 
more limited effect of this factor. It comes out clearly only when we make a distinc-
tion between households with younger and older heads, or between owners of high-
value and low-value homes (the latter may save to upgrade to better homes).
The increasing private burden of education and health expenditures seems among 
the strongest candidates for explaining the increase in savings rates, at least during 
a transition period. Our estimates show that health expenditure-related risks can 
largely explain the dramatic increase in savings rates among elderly households. 
The uncertainty related to those expenditures can also increase aggregate savings 
rates despite the higher consumption expenditures of the households suffering an 
adverse health shock.45 Our estimates suggest that the elimination of the risk of 
health expenditures exceeding 20 percent of income (through a catastrophic insur-
ance scheme) would have lowered the median savings rate in 2005 by 3.5 percentage 
points, assuming no behavioral responses to such a scheme. Differences in saving 
behavior by households with children of different ages are consistent with expected 
future education expenditures increasing savings (or at least lowering consumption).
The effects of these shifts, together with precautionary motives stemming from 
state enterprise restructuring and market-oriented reforms, should eventually fade 
as households adjust their consumption plans and build up a level of assets appropri-
ate for this post-transition environment. This build-up in savings could have been 
smaller if financial markets were more developed. Financial frictions also strengthen 
precautionary savings motives, and borrowing constraints can play an important role 
in driving up savings rates despite rapid income growth, especially among younger 
households. Finally, we also found some weak indirect evidence in support of the 
“target saving” hypothesis, whereby Chinese households have high savings rates 
because they are targeting a certain level of wealth and the real return on their 
savings, most of which goes into bank deposits, is small (and has recently become 
negative).
What are the implications of our findings for the debate about how to “rebalance” 
China’s growth by boosting domestic consumption? As financial markets develop, 
households should benefit from being able to borrow against future income, better 
opportunities for portfolio diversification, and better rates of return on their savings. 
Improvements in the social safety net would pool the risks associated with idiosyn-
cratic income shocks and health expenditures, reducing the need for households 
to save in order to self-insure against these risks. Increasing public provision of 
education could also lower household savings by reducing the need to accumulate 
assets to finance future education expenditures. Thus, policies that foster financial 
sector development and increased social expenditures could play an important role 
in helping to smooth consumption over the life cycle (Blanchard and Giavazzi 2006). 
This would moderate household savings rates and help in rebalancing growth toward 
consumption.
45 During the transition to a steady state with a higher level of savings for these reasons, the short-run cross-
sectional dynamics would imply an increase in savings as most households would have net savings, with only a 
small fraction of them drawing down their savings to meet these expenditures
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